Media Liability for Injuries That Result from Television Broadcasts to Immature Audiences by Miller, Nancy L.
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 22 
Issue 1 Proceedings of the University of San 
Diego Corporate Tax Conference 
Article 12 
1-1-1985 
Media Liability for Injuries That Result from Television Broadcasts 
to Immature Audiences 
Nancy L. Miller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nancy L. Miller, Media Liability for Injuries That Result from Television Broadcasts to Immature 
Audiences, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 377 (1985). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol22/iss1/12 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 
MEDIA LIABILITY FOR INJURIES THAT RESULT
FROM TELEVISION BROADCASTS TO IMMATURE
AUDIENCES
This comment examines the tort liability of broadcasters for in-
juries that result from children's imitating acts of television vio-
lence. The comment proposes a cause of action in negligence de-
rived from tort doctrines that recognize a special duty to children.
The comment asserts that the First Amendment does not preclude
liability and illustrates how any effect on free speech would be
minimal.
INTRODUCTION.
There was a child went forth every day, and the first object he
look'd upon, that object he became, and that object became part
of him for the day or a certain part of the day or for many years
or stretching cycles of years.'
A ten-year-old child arrives at school with a lethal weapon. She
conceals the weapon until recess when she takes it out of her pocket
and commences target practice. The weapon is a three-sided piece of
sheet metal, known as an oriental throwing star or shuriken.2 In Cal-
ifornia it is a felony to possess one.' The throwing star accidentally
misses its inanimate target and severely injures another child. The
child might also have recklessly aimed at the other child. In either
case, questions of where the child got the star and who is to be held
liable for the resulting injuries must be considered. Possible answers
would include:
1. The child alone thought of the idea, constructed the star, and
educated herself on its use as a weapon. It is possible her parents
and teachers were unaware that she possessed it or did not recognize
its dangerous nature. In such a case, the child could be found subject
1. WALT WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS, at 282 (1899).
2. The San Diego Union reported that, on one day, forty oriental throwing stars
were confiscated from fourth and fifth grade children at school. The children had con-
structed the stars themselves after getting the idea from a television show, The Master,
aired at 8:00 on a Friday evening (a time likely to attract a large audience of children).
San Diego Union, March 28, 1984, § 8, at 3, col. 1.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020(c) (West Supp. 1984).
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to liability4 either in negligence or for intentional infliction of injury
upon another.'
2. The child's parents made the weapon and gave it to her or left
it lying about and the child took it without their permission. In these
situations, both the child and her parents would be held subject to
liability for entrusting their child with, or negligently allowing their
child to gain access to, a dangerous instrument."
3. The child's neighbor left the star protruding from a tree in his
backyard. The child trespassed onto the neighbor's property and re-
trieved the star. In this situation, both child and the neighbor can be
held subject to liability for any resulting damage because the neigh-
bor's negligence made the weapon available.7
4. The child purchased the star at a store where such weapons
were sold indiscriminantely to children. In addition to the child,
courts could hold both the manufacturer and retailer subject to lia-
bility for having negligently marketed the item to children.8
5. The child's shop class teacher provided instructions to her on
how to make such a weapon and supervised its construction. The
courts could hold the teacher subject to liability for directly inviting
the child to create a dangerous weapon and providing her with the
necessary materials and information to do so.9
Common sense seems to dictate that liability be imposed in all the
above situations. A consideration of the following factual variation
4. Subject to liability, here, means that the issue of liability would ultimately be
determined by a jury or fact finder depending on the facts of the individual case. Each
case presents unique issues of foreseeability and causation that need to be resolved by the
jury.
5. Children are usually subject to liability for both negligent and intentional in-
fliction of injuries based on what is reasonable for the child's age and experience. W.
PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, TORTS § 134, at 1071, § 32, at 179 (5th ed. 1984).
6. A parent who either intentionally or negligently allows his or her child to have
access to a dangerous weapon can be held liable for negligence. See Kuhns v. Brugger,
390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395 (1957); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390
(1977). For a general discussion of negative entrustment see W. PROSSER & W.P. KEE-
TON, supra note 5, § 33, at 197-203.
7. If a child who is not aware of the hazard presented by the unguarded
instrumentality finds it and carries it away, and it later occasions an injury to
such child or another, the person whose negligence made the instrumentality
available may be held liable for the harm done by it, whether he left the instru-
mentality unguarded or abandoned it, in either a public place or on premises
which he occupies or controls.
57 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 119, at 471 (1971); see also Kingsland v. Erie County Agricul-
tural Soc'y, 298 N.Y. 404, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949); Louisville S.N.R. Co. v. Voughn, 292
Ky. 120, 166 S.W.2d 43 (1942).
8. See Monning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977) (the manu-
facturer and retailer held liable for injury inflicted by a sling shot sold to a child).
9. The two elements of such "pied piper" liability cases are an implied invitation
to do something posing a risk of harm, and maintaining or providing the instrumentality
that causes injury. See Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Shannon, 257 Ga. 402, 276
S.E.2d 580 (1981).
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also seems to lead to a similar conclusion:
6. A television broadcaster airs a show during prime time on a
Friday evening. The leading characters of the program use throwing
stars to inflict injury upon others. The throwing stars can easily be
constructed from sheet metal or a tin can lid by a young child. A
child watching the show learns by observation how to throw the stars
and is inspired to construct and use the weapons for recreation. The
child mentioned earlier arrives at school with the star. She throws it
intentionally or negligently at another child and an injury results.
In most past cases against broadcasters involving injuries resulting
from children's imitative acts, the broadcasters have been immu-
nized from liability by the first amendment.' ° In these cases the
courts did not even allow the jury to make a factual determination of
negligence. Rather, the courts have held, as a matter of law, that
broadcasters are immune."
For example, in the case of Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting
Co., Inc.,"2 a television network broadcasted during prime time a
scene that graphically depicted the artificial rape of a young girl.
Several days later a nine-year-old girl was artificially raped with a
bottle by a group of youngsters who had allegedly been inspired by
the broadcast. The court refused to determine whether the broadcast
had legally caused the rape. 13 Instead, the court attempted to apply
the strict constitutional standard of incitement established in Bran-
denberg v. Ohio.'4 The court in Olivia determined that the facts of
10. E.g., Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178
Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert. denied sub. nom. Neimi v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
458 U.S. 1108, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1132 (1982); Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v.
Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276, S.E.2d 580 (1981); DeFilipo v. National Broadcasting Co.,
Inc., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982). The first amendment prohibits governmental infringe-
ments on freedom of speech. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The potential of self censorship that
results from subjecting broadcasters to liability creates a first amendment conflict. For
further discussion of the first amendment and its application to tort liability for broad-
casters see infra notes 111-157, and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. The practice of holding broad-
casters immune means the issues of causation and duty have remained undetermined.
12. 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert. denied sub nom.
Neimi v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 458 U.S. 1108, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1132
(1982).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 104-10, for a discussion of causation.
14. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenberg, the Supreme Court addressed the con-
stitutionality of a criminal syndicalist statute that made it a crime to advocate violence.
It was not a case about civil liability for resultant personal injuries nor did it deal with
children or the broadcast media. Brandenberg involved a Ku Klux Klan rally where a
speaker made derogatory remarks about certain ethnic groups. The court held that unless
the speaker's words were "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
likely to incite or produce such action the speech could not be constitutionally pro-
the case did not satisfy the Brandenberg standard, and thereby im-
munized the broadcaster from a determination of liability by the
jury.15
Several other courts have used this same rationale which had the
effect of protecting broadcasters. In Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v.
Shannon" and DeFilipo v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc.,'7 the
courts also refused to submit the plaintiff's claims to the jury for
factual determinations of negligence. Unable as a matter of law to fit
the facts into the preexisting categories of speech exempted from
first amendment protection, the courts dismissed these cases without
further analysis.
One notable case, however, refused to allow the broadcaster to
hide behind the first amendment. In Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.,"5
a jury found a radio station negligent as a result of a broadcast
which invited the audience to participate in a contest. The contes-
tants were encouraged to be the first to locate a disc jockey who was
driving around the city. Two contestants in separate cars forced the
decedent off the road as they sped to catch the disc jockey's car. On
appeal from the trial court's determination of liability, it was held
that the broadcast had created an unreasonable risk of harm by
stimulating the youthful listeners to act recklessly.19 The California
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision and explicitly
stated that the first amendment would not protect a broadcaster
from civil liability where a broadcast had created an undue risk of
harm.20
These cases illustrate the law as it currently exists concerning
scribed." Id. at 447. This Comment asserts that the Brandenberg standard is not applica-
ble in a civil case where an injured plaintiff is seeking compensation. For a further dis-
cussion of the Brandenberg incitement standard and its inapplicability to this case see
infra text and accompanying notes 146-151.
15. 126 Cal. App. 3d at 495, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
16. 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981). This case involved a young child who
attempted to imitate a sound effect demonstration broadcast on television. The demon-
stration consisted of placing a piece of lead into a balloon. When the child imitated the
demonstration, his balloon burst and propelled the lead into his eye. The court conceded
that the broadcast may have posed a foreseeable risk of injury. That issue, however, was
never presented to a jury because the court held that the broadcast was protected by the
first amendment. Id. at 405, 276 S.E.2d at 583.
17. 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982). In DeFilippo, a child hanged himself after watch-
ing a stuntman perform a hanging demonstration. As in Olivia, the court applied the
Brandenberg incitement standard and held there was no liability for the broadcaster.
18. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
19. Id. at 47, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
20. Defendant's contention that the giveaway contest must be afforded the
deference due society's interest in the First Amendment is clearly without merit.
The issue here is civil accountability for the foreseeable results of a broadcast
which created an undue risk of harm to decedent. The First Amendment does
not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely because achieved by word,
rather than act.
Id. at 48, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
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broadcaster liability. On the one hand, the Olivia N., Shannon, and
Defilippo courts used the first amendment to immunize the broad-
casters from liability. On the other hand the Weirum court unani-
mously found the broadcaster accountable for negligence-notwith-
standing the first amendment.
The contention of this Comment is that, when a child or a third
party is injured as a result of the child's imitative act of television
violence, the broadcaster should be held subject to liability. As with
the parents, teachers, and neighbors in the introductory hypotheti-
cals (1.-5.), the issue of whether the broadcaster exercised reasona-
ble care in the particular case should be presented to a jury for de-
termination. The broadcaster should not be immunized from liability
exposure if an innocent victim has been injured as a direct result of a
negligent broadcast. Using the aforementioned hypothetical (6.), the
Comment will propose a cause of action based in negligence, discuss
why the first amendment does not preclude liability, and illustrate
how the effect on free speech from recognizing such a cause of ac-
tion would be minimal.
WHY HOLD BROADCASTERS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR IMITATIVE ACTS
OF VIOLENCE?
Despite the concern of many social scientists and parents, the level
of violence in the media has remained constant." Eighty percent of
all programs contain some violence.2 The networks' output of vio-
lence averages about eight incidents of force intended to hurt or kill
per hour.23 Cartoons average twenty-two incidents of force per
hour.24
In 1972 the Surgeon General published a report which concluded
that "the causal relationship between televised violence and anti-so-
cial behavior is sufficient to warrant appropriate and immediate re-
medial action."' 25 An additional ten years of study conducted by the
Surgeon General affirmed that violence on television causes aggres-
sive behavior in children and teenagers. Further studies show that
21. Albert, Constitutional Regulation of Televised Violence, 64 VA. L. REV.
1299, 1305-1306 (1978).
22. Id.
23. Steinfeld, TV Violence is Harmful, 102 READERS DIGEST, 37 (1973).
24. Id.
25. Surgeon General's Report by the Scientific Advisory Committee on Televi-
sion and Social Behavior: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 26 (1972) (statement by Dr. Jesse
Steinfeld, Surgeon General).
children imitate specific violent acts from television.20
Despite these studies, however, the Federal Communications Com-
mission (F.C.C.) prefers industry self-regulation to the adoption of
rigid government standards.2 7 The National Association of Broad-
casters (NAB) is a trade association that protects broadcasters' in-
terests. NAB has voluntarily adopted a set of "rules" which give the
appearance of self-regulation but which, in actuality, have no real
efficacy.28 Self regulation may now become even less of a solution
since the F.C.C. recently indicated an inclination toward deregula-
tion of the broadcast media.29 With the F.C.C. decision to deregu-
late and broadcasters' refusal to voluntarily limit violent program-
ming, the problem of televised violence is not likely to be abated by
enforced regulatory or voluntary measures.
Government regulation, furthermore, is not the judicially pre-
ferred solution to the problem of television violence. The court in
Writers' Guild of America, West v. F.C.C.,30 rejected governmental
interference in programming content. The court held that program-
ming decisions must rest with the individual broadcasters. 31 This re-
flects the long standing judicial policy that prior restraint on regula-
tion of the media is less desirable than imposing sanctions after a
particular broadcaster has acted improperly.32
Sanctions other than civil liability could be imposed upon broad-
casters if they negligently expose children to acts of violence that are
26. Walsh, Wide World of Reports, 220 SCIENCE 804 (1982). See also infra note
83.
27. Turow, Non-Fiction on Commercial Children's Television: Trends and Policy
Implications, 27 J. BROADCASTING 437 (1980).
28. Persky, Self Regulation of Broadcasting - Does It Exist?, 27 J. Com. 202
(1977). The NAB code is not enforced and it appears to be a public relations ploy to
ward off governmental regulation. In fact, when the government attempted to enforce the
standards formulated by the industry itself in the code, the NAB actively lobbied against
the code's adoption. Liebert, Television and Social Learning: Some Relationships Be-
tween Viewing and Violence and Behaving Aggressively, in TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BE-
HAVIOR, SURGEON GENERAL'S SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TELEVISION AND
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, 1975 TECHNICAL REPORT (Vol. 2) 134 (Murray, Rubinstein & Com-
stock, eds. 1975).
29. F.C.C. Weakens Policy on Children's Program Rule, L.A. Daily Journal,
Dec. 27, 1983, at 3, col. 1. For example, the F.C.C. voted to weaken a policy that en-
couraged programing for children much to the dismay of concerned activist organiza-
tions. Id.
30. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976). In this case the court struck down an
F.C.C. policy of reducing violence during the prime time family viewing hour (from
seven to nine p.m.) as unconstitutional because it was adopted as a result of extreme
governmental pressure. Id. at 1151.
31. Id. at 1143.
32. "Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes
what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence ... " Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1930).
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likely to be imitated.33 The fact remains, however, that when an in-
nocent plaintiff is injured there is a need for compensation. Broad-
casters profit from the exhibition of violence on television.34 It makes
sense that they should compensate the innocent victim who is injured
as a result of their negligence. To immunize broadcasters is incon-
gruous with an entire body of analogous law that holds those who
create an unreasonable risk of harm are subject to liability.3 5
ESTABLISHING A CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEGLIGENCE
For a broadcaster to be held liable in negligence for a child's imi-
tative act of television violence it would be necessary to establish the
following elements: a causal connection between the broadcast and
the injury, a duty to the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care in light
of the circumstances, and a breach of that duty resulting in the crea-
tion of an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff.3 6
Establishing a Duty
As with any cause of action for negligence, a primary question is
whether the defendant owes a duty to the injured party.3 7 This issue
must be decided on a case by case basis by applying the general rule
that a person must use ordinary care to insure that others are not
injured as a result of his or her conduct .3
The duty of care is essentially related to circumstances of time,
place, and person.39 It is a conclusory policy determination by the
33. These include criminal sanctions such as fines and administrative sanctions
such as license revocation or refusal to renew a license. Cf. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Founda-
tion, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (administrative sanctions); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (criminal sanctions).
34. Producers use violence in television shows because it gains attention. Broad-
casters air these programs in order to assemble the largest audiences and thus to maxi-
mize their profits. See G. COMSTOCK, TELEVISION IN AMERICA 73 (1980).
35. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
36. The discussion of proximate cause as an element in the establishment of a
cause of action in negligence has been folded into the discussion of duty in this Com-
ment. As stated by Prosser, "[i]t is quite possible to state every question which arises in
connection with 'proximate cause' in the form of a single question: Was the defendant
under a duty to protect the plaintiff against the event which did in fact occur?" W.
PROSSER & W. P. KEETON, supra note 5, § 42, at 274.
37. Weirum v. RKO, 15 Cal. 3d 40, 45, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471
(1975).
38. Id. at 46, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
39. United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 463
P.2d 770, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1970) (duty is not a fixed standard but a flexible determi-
nation based on the facts of a particular case).
court that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.40 A number
of considerations can justify an imposition of duty in a particular
case.
41
Special Duties to Children
In many situations, a person will be deemed to have a duty to
anticipate and guard against the conduct of another,42 especially that
of a child.43 In general, courts have held that greater care must be
exercised when dealing with children than when dealing with
adults. 44 Much is to be anticipated of a child that would not be ex-
pected of an adult, such as carelessness and impulsiveness. 4" The
mere presence of children serves as a warning to require the exercise
of a higher degree of care for their safety and the safety of others.46
Several courts in different fact situations, have recognized such
demands for a higher standard of care for children. For example, a
number of cases have held street vendors liable when children at-
tracted to their product carelessly ran into the street and were in-
jured by traffic.47 This duty runs to children unobserved by the ven-
dor if their presence may be anticipated due to the attractiveness of
the product to young children.48 As with street vendors, broadcasters
should recognize children's attraction to television and anticipate
that children are in the audience. A greater degree of care should be
exercised for their safety, and the safety of others, by eliminating the
exhibition of acts of violence that are likely to be imitated.
Under the doctrine of negligent entrustment,49 a reasonable person
must consider the immaturity, inexperience, and carelessness of chil-
dren and act accordingly to ensure their safety and the safety of
others.50 The court in Monning v. Alfono5' held that, when dealing
40. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551
P.2d 334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976).
41. Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 46, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
42. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 5, § 33.
43. Id. at 200.
44. E.g., Schwartz v. Helms, 67 Cal. 2d 232, 430 P.2d 68, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510
(1967).
45. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
46. E.g., Hilyar v. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal. 2d 30, 286 P.2d 21 (1955).
47. Ellis v. Trowen Frozen Foods, 264 Cal. App. 2d 499, 70 Cal. Rptr. 487
(1968); see also cases cited supra notes 44, 46.
48. Ellis v. Trowen Frozen Foods, 264 Cal. App. 2d at 501, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
"It is common knowledge that from small children one can expect almost any kind of
heedless and impulsive conduct." Femling v. Star Pub. Co., 195 Wash. 395, 401, 81 P.2d
243, 295 (1938). When one has notice of the likelihood of the presence of a child, "the
amount of care necessary to constitute reasonable care is very great." Id.
49. See supra notes 6-7.
50. A reasonable person will have in mind the immaturity, inexperience and
carelessness of children. If, taking those traits into account, a reasonable person
would recognize that his conduct involves a risk of creating an invasion of the
child's or some other person's interest, he is required to recognize that his con-
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with children, one must take into account a child's tendency to do
mischievous acts. 52 Entrusting potentially dangerous articles to a
child is unreasonable because the child may "use the article frivo-
lously due to immaturity of judgment, exuberance of spirit or sheer
bravado.'3
As illustrated in hypothetical (2) in the Introduction, if parents or
neighbors give a potentially dangerous article to a child, they would
be held subject to liability for any damages resulting from their neg-
ligence.54 Similarly if a broadcaster gives a child a dangerous idea,
that he or she is likely to imitate, the broadcaster should be held
subject to liability for the very same reasons.
An analogous doctrine holds that a dangerous article negligently
left where a child may find it creates an unreasonable risk of harm
to either the child or a third party.5 5 If the child finds the article and
injures a third party with it, the owner of the article may be held
liable for making it accessible to the child.56 Liability may result
even if the child is a trespasser.57
A parent or neighbor who negligently leaves a throwing star in a
place accessible to a child will be held subject to liability due to the
unreasonable risk of harm created .5  Likewise a broadcaster who al-
lows children to gain access to a dangerous instrumentality by expos-
ing them to an idea that can be easily imitated should be held sub-
ject to liability.
Similarly, the attractive nuisance doctrine59 imposes a duty of care
duct does involve such risk.
He should realize that the inexperience and immaturity of young children
may lead them to act innocently in a way which an adult would recognize as
culpably careless, and that older children are peculiarly prone to conduct which
they recognize as careless or even reckless.
Monning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 446, 254 N.W.2d 759, 769 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 comment (k) (1977)).
51. 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977).
52. Id. at 444, 254 N.W.2d at 768.
53. Id. at 447, 254 N.W.2d at 769.
54. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 6-7; "[s]ome instrumentalities easily accessible to children,
are not only inherently dangerous but inherently attractive and alluring." Louisville
S.H.R. Co. v. Vaughn, 292 Ky. 120, 126, 166 S.W.2d 43, 46 (1946). "It is ... a reason-
able rule that regards the characteristics and habits, the unpredictable acts of daring, the
reckless tendencies, and lack of discretion, caution and judgment ... of children." Id.
56. Id.
57. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D, Torts § 119 at 471 (for discussion of trespassing); see
also supra note 7 (for a general discussion of liability as to children).
58. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1977).
on a landowner to protect trespassing children because of their in-
ability to appreciate danger and their disregard of risk.60 Because a
child's parent cannot possibly follow him or her about or "chain him
[or her] to the bedpost,"61 the landowner has a duty to make the
premises safe against harm to a child."2 The landowner's right to use
land as he or she pleases may be outweighed by the greater interest
in the safety of children. 3 Broadcasters' rights to use the media as
they please should also be balanced with the societal interest in the
safety of children and others. 4
The requirement of the exercise of a higher standard of care for
children is based on the very propensities of children that make it
likely for them to imitate unique acts of violence on television: their
inability to appreciate danger, 5 their disregard of risk, their ten-
dency to do mischievous acts,66 and their immaturity, inexperience,
and carelessness.67
There is little difference between a child who trespasses onto her
neighbor's property and retrieves a throwing star that the neighbor
negligently left lodged in a tree and a child who learns by observing
a television show how to fashion and use a throwing star. In both
cases the child's lack of judgment, inability to assess the risk, imma-
turity, mischievousness and curiosity result in a dangerous situation.
Furthermore, in the broadcast situation, a child's attraction to adult
role models and his or her propensity to imitate them compounds the
risk. 6 Therefore, the defendants in both cases should be held to the
same legal standard of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent
risk.69
Similarly, one undertaking to direct the action of another must do
so with due care, especially when dealing with children. 0 Research-
ers conclude that television is a powerful educator of young chil-
dren.71 Children spend a great deal of their time watching televi-
60. Monning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. at 445, 254 N.W.2d at 768 (1977).
61. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 5, at § 59.
62. Id. This same argument may be analogized to parental supervision of their
children's television viewing. Parents should not be expected to constantly supervise their
children's viewing, especially during daytime and early evening hours, any more than
they should be expected to follow them around the neighborhood.
63. Id.
64. See infra notes 111-57 and accompanying text for discussion of broadcasters'
first amendment rights.
65. Monning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425 at 445, 254 N.W.2d 759 at 768.
66. Id. at 444, 254 N.W.2d at 768.
67. Id. at 446, 254 N.W.2d at 768.
68. See generally Rothenberg, The Role of Television in Shaping the Attitudes
of Children, 22 THE AM. ACAD. OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 86 (1983).
69. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 5, § 33.
70. Schwartz v. Helms, 67 Cal. 2d at 232, 238, 430 P.2d 68 at 72, 60 Cal. Rptr.
510 at 514.
71. "The bald fact is that television has the power to educate, and whether that
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sion"2  at the presumed invitation of the broadcaster.7 3  The
broadcaster should be considered as having voluntarily assumed a
duty to entertain and educate children with due regard for their
safety.74
Foreseeability of Risk
Foreseeability of risk is also essential to a finding of duty to the
injured party.75 A broadcaster should not be held liable for all imita-
tive acts of violence by children that result in injury. As with all
negligence cases liability must be judged on a case by case basis.76 A
broadcaster should be held liable only for those injuries that result
from a foreseeable risk of harm.7
While duty is a question of law, foreseeability is a question of fact
for the jury's consideration. In the throwing star hypothetical (6)
there is ample evidence to support a finding that a risk of harm was
foreseeable. An examination of some of the factors which a jury
could take into consideration, in deciding the issue of foreseeability,
will support this conclusion.
The intervening act of a third party, in this instance the child,
education is of a positive or a negative nature depends upon the types of program(s) that
are disseminated to the public." Mosberg, Trauma, Television, Movies and Misinforma-
tion, 8 NEUROSURGERY 756 (1981); see also, N. RuSTEIN, Go WATCH TV! 3-5 (1974).
72. Four- and five-year olds spend 60% of their non-sleeping hours watching tele-
vision. Devney & Bensel, Television and Children: A Physician's Guide, MINN. MED.
833 (1979). By the age of twelve, most children have spent twice as much time viewing
television as they have spent attending school. Steinfeld, supra note 23, at 37. By the
time they have graduated from high school they will have viewed an estimated 18,000
murders. Rothenberg, Effect of Television Violence on Children and Youth, 234
J.A.M.A. 1043 (1975).
73. Twenty-five percent of the television industry's profit comes from children's
programming (frequent sources of the revenues are the advertising of toys, candy, and
other products aimed at children). See Rothenberg, supra note 72.
74. The NAB code has recognized a special duty to children; however, the code is
not enforced. "Television and all who participate are jointly accountable to the American
public for respect for the special needs of children." R. LIEBERT, J. NEAL & E. DAVID-
SON, THE EARLY WINDOW: EFFECTS OF TELEVISION ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH 134-35
(1973). The NAB code also states: "The presentation of techniques of crime in such
detail as to incite imitation shall be avoided . . .violence and illicit sex shall not be
presented in an attractive manner." Id. at 135. Despite these statements, however, chil-
dren's television is six times more violent than adult television. Rothenberg, supra note
72, at 1043.
75. Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 46, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
76. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 44 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80
(1968).
77. Id. at 739, 44 P.2d at 51, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
78. Weirum v. RKO, 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471
(1975).
may preclude liability. 9 However, if the likelihood of such an act
was the very hazard that made the broadcast negligent, the jury
would probably find the broadcaster liable. In all of the introductory
hypotheticals, it is the likelihood that the child will injure another
with a dangerous weapon that makes the actor negligent. The inter-
vening act of the child would most likely not preclude liability. On
the other hand, if the act of the child was unforeseeable, or occurred
in an unforeseeable way, the jury would probably not find the broad-
caster liable.80
The possibility of a child imitating a unique act of violence from
television and causing injury to himself or another is highly foresee-
able considering the available studies and statistics. 81 These studies
suggest quite convincingly "that spontaneous imitation of aggressive
behaviors learned from television does occur. ' '82 This has been con-
firmed in laboratory tests, documented case histories, and interviews
with youngsters themselves.83
79. The act of a third person does not break the chain of causation if "the realiz-
able likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of
the hazards which makes the actor negligent .... [Sluch an act whether innocent, neg-
ligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for
harm caused thereby." Schwartz v. Helms, 67 Cal. 2d 232, 241-42, 430 P.2d 68, 74, 60
Cal. Rptr. 510, 516 (1967).
80. For example, a child might use a gun to imitate a television show. It is not
apt to be found foreseeable that a young child will have access to such a dangerous
weapon. Another example might be a child who possesses knowledge that is out of the
ordinary. A child prodigy who learns at an early age how to build sophisticated explo-
sives from a television show and does build them. The issue of foreseeability in any case
would be decided by the finder of fact.
81. "The studies support one broad conclusion which is quite clear ... there is a
relationship between violence on television and violence in society." MURRAY, TELEVI-
SION AND YOUTH: 25 YEARS OF RESEARCH AND CONTROVERSY 39 (1980). The number
of juveniles arrested for serious or violent crimes between 1952 and 1972 increased
1600%. M. WINN, THE PLUG-IN DRUG (1978); Mednick, Human Nature, Crime, and
Society: Keynote Address, 347 N.Y. ACAD. Sci. ANNALS 319 (1980). This dramatic
change in violence by children occurred during a period when the number of hours chil-
dren spent viewing television was on the increase and when the violence portrayed on
television increased ninety percent. M. WINN, supra, at 76. See also Devney & Bensel,
supra note 72, at 834.
Most violent crimes are committed by young males in late adolescence, Eron & Hues-
mann, Adolescent Aggression and Television, 347 N.Y. ACAD. Sci. ANNALS 319 (1980).
Scientists claim that viewing violent television is an important cause of violent behavior
in adolescents. Id. at 320. In fact it has been reported that the best prediction of how
aggressive a man will be at nineteen is how much violence he watched at the age of
eight. Id. at 319.
82. Liebert, supra note 28, at 9.
83. Id. In one study, 88% of the subjects aged 3-5 displayed imitative aggression,
without being asked to do so by the researcher, after a brief exposure to a filmed model.
Some of the subjects acted like virtual "carbon copies" of the filmed model; sixty percent
of all first graders asked claimed they copy what they see on television. R. LIEBERT, J.
NEAL & E. DAVIDSON, supra note 74, at 54.
There have been numerous incidents of bizarre violent acts that directly imitate and
appear to be inspired by an identifiable television scene. For examples of publicized inci-
dents, see R. LIEBERT, J. NEAL & E. DAVIDSON, supra note 74, at 1-3; G. COWAN, SEE
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Foreseeability does not require the occurrence of prior, identical,
or even similar events.84 However, evidence of prior incidents, taken
as a whole, may be sufficiently related to give the broadcaster notice
of the likelihood that a child may imitate a unique act seen on televi-
sion.8 5 Documented cases of imitation, along with field and labora-
tory studies and recommendations by doctors,8 6 would seem to put
the broadcaster on notice of the high foreseeability of risk of imita-
tive behavior by children.
A child's age might also be a factor for a jury to consider in as-
sessing the foreseeability of risk. Younger children are less able to
distinguish between reality and fantasy than an older child.8 7 They
are less experienced and more likely to adopt what they see on televi-
sion as part of their behavior. 8
Because a child's age might be considered in assessing foreseeabil-
ity of risk, the time of day of broadcast might also become impor-
tant. It would be reasonable for a jury to consider that three- to
four-year-olds are likely to watch television on weekday and week-
end mornings or that it is unlikely such children will be watching
late in the evening. Foreseeability and duty to that age group could
diminish as the likelihood that they will be in the audience decreases.
Parental responsibility might also be a factor a jury would con-
sider in assessing the foreseeability of risk created by the broadcast.
The jury may reason that a parent should be able to assume that a
television broadcast in the after-school hours is suitable for children
to watch.8 9 A jury might conclude that because a broadcaster has a
duty to broadcast in the public interest" parents should reasonably
No EVIL 70-71 (1979); Spak, Predictable Harm: Should the Media be Liable? 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 671 (1981). *
84. Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 329, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 497 (1981).
85. See generally id. at 330, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
86. "The time is long past due for a major, organized cry of protest from the
medical profession in relation to what in political terms is a national scandal." Rothen-
berg, Effect of Television Violence on Children and Youth, 234 J.A.M.A. 1043, 1045
(1975); see also Prelend, TV & Violence, 11 AuSTL. FAM. PHYSICIAN 833 (1982); Are
Children Affected by Television Violence?, 76 TEX. MED. 21, 21, 22 (1980); Trauma
Television, Movies, and Misinformation, 8 NEUROSURGERY 756 (1981).
87. Morrison, Reasoning About the Realities on Television: A Development
Study, 25 J. BROADCASTING 229 (1981).
88. N. RUSTEIN, Go WATCH TV! 98 (1974).
89. This is somewhat analogous to the attractive nuisance cases where a parent
cannot be expected to follow his or her children around the neighborhood or chain them
to the bedpost. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
90. Because of the limited magnetic spectrum, only a limited number of stations
can operate without interference. The government issues a limited number of licenses
have some assurance that there will not be content inappropriate for
children during hours when it is likely that children will be in the
audience. A jury might consider that a broadcaster's liability expo-
sure ought to be inversely correlated to parental responsibility de-
pending on the time of day.
At certain times of day a jury might find it in unreasonable for the
broadcaster to rely on the responsibility of parents in light of the
great risk of harm that children may imitate certain acts of vio-
lence. 91 Juries might take into account that parents may be unaware
of the possible negative effects of broadcasting upon their children . 2
Furthermore, they are not in a position to predict, with any cer-
tainty, when a broadcaster will air programs with inappropriate con-
tent for a child. The vast number of children likely to be affected
and the seriousness of the danger might convince a jury that it is
unreasonable for the broadcaster to place reliance upon parents 3
during certain hours. Conversely, it might be unreasonable for par-
ents to place reliance on broadcasters at certain hours when it is not
likely children will be in the audience.
which must be used by broadcasters in the public interest. The few who are granted
access to this limited resource must represent the interests of all. See Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see also Note, The Future of Content Regu-
lation in Broadcasting, 69 CAL. L. REv. 555, 577 (1981).
91. "[I]n many situations where the risk is unduly great, it is not reasonable care
to rely upon the responsibility of others." W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 5, §
33, at 204.
92. Romar, Dealing with the Controversies Over Children's Television, USA To-
DAY, Sept. 1980, at 62. See also Devney & Bensel, supra note 72, at 837, "Many par-
ents have no idea of the power of TV."
93. The factors to consider in determining whether it is reasonable to rely on
another are:
The competence and reliability of the person upon whom reliance is placed, the
person's understanding of the situation, the seriousness of the danger and the
number of persons likely to be affected, the length of time elapsed, and above all
the likelihood that proper care will not be used, and the ease with which the
actor himself may take precautions. If an attempt must be made to generalize,
it may be said that when the defendant is under a duty to act reasonably for the
protection of the plaintiff, and may anticipate that a third person may fail to use
proper care if the responsibility is transferred to him, and that serious harm will
follow if he does not, it is not reasonable care to place reliance upon the third
person.
W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 5, § 33, at 205. These factors can be applied to
the case of a broadcaster's reliance on parental responsibility. The parent may not (1) be
competent or reliable, or (2) understand the potential negative effects television has on
young children. From a policy perspective it would be much more difficult to mass edu-
cate parents on television's potential dangers than to hold broadcasters responsible for
programming material that is potentially dangerous. See G. COMSTOCK, TELEVISION AND
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 396. In addition, the danger of physical injury or death is very seri-
ous; the number of persons likely to be affected, considering the vast television audience,
is considerable; and parents do not exercise much control over their children's viewing.
Schafer & Walsh, Factors Affecting Parental Control over Children's Television liew-
ing, 24 J. BROADCASTING 411 (1980). The broadcaster is in the best position to take
precautions to avoid exposing children to unnecessary risk of harm.
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In Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of California,9 4 the
court held that when a psychiatrist has reason to suspect that a pa-
tient poses a serious violent threat to a third party, he or she has a
duty to warn the potential victim. If the psychiatrist fails to do so, he
or she may be held liable to those foreseeably injured if the threat is
carried out.95 The court rejected the defendant's argument that ther-
apists are unable to reliably predict violent acts.96 It reasoned that
psychiatrists are capable of using the judgment required of all pro-
fessionals under accepted rules of responsibility17 The court has-
tened to say that therapists would not be held to a standard of
perfection. Rather, if the therapist exercised a reasonable degree of
skill, knowledge, and care expected of that professional specialty the
psychiatrist could not be held liable even if an injury resulted. 8
The standards set forth in Tarasoff could also be applied to the
broadcast industry. The jury would consider whether the broadcaster
had exercised a reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ex-
pected of professional broadcasters. The standard of care might be
met if precautions given by professionals employed by the broadcast-
ers were followed. 99 The networks employ advisors who act as profes-
sional censors to regulate content. 00 The network standards on vio-
lence, however, are not promulgated in recognition of a duty to
prevent harm to the public but in fear of losing viewers.' 0' Censors'
instructions are often ignored, even when they warn about a risk of
possible imitation.0 2 Broadcasting a show, in light of such profes-
sional warnings, certainly adds to the foreseeability of risk and
94. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551, P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 433-34, 551 P.2d at 344-45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25.
97. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
98. Id.
99. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 5, § 32, at 185. Just as psychiatrists
have special skills and training, so do broadcasters. The competitiveness of the industry
necessitates that the broadcasters know about mass psychology and marketing. Because
broadcasters have this special knowledge, they ought to apply it reasonably to prevent
foreseeable injury. As might be expected, however, quite the opposite is the case. Many
broadcasters themselves have provided evidence that they use violence as an easy way to
raise ratings. Writers Guild v. F.C.C., 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1095 (1976). "[T]he race for
audience ratings too often blinds us to our basic responsibilities. And in serving ourselves
we often do great disservice to our viewers" (quoting James E. Duffy, President of Amer-
ican Broadcasting Company (ABC) Television Network). Id.
100. R. LIEBERT, J. NEAL & E. DAVIDSON, supra note 74, at 140.
101. Id. at 146.
102. Id. at 141. Actual recommendations made by a censor include the following:
"[D]o not reveal demonstration of arson techniques,. . . to invite imitation. Do not show
how the torch is made and invite imitation . . ..." etc. Id. at 142.
would be a factor to influence a jury determination.
All of the positive and negative factors that are relevant to a spe-
cific case could be balanced by the jury to ascertain the foreseeabil-
ity of risk in broadcasting a particular show. The balancing of these
factors, concededly, may be difficult. It must be remembered, how-
ever, that "the alleged inability to fix definitions for recovery on the
different facts of future cases does not justify the denial of recovery
on the specific facts of the instant case; in any event proper guide-
lines can indicate the extent of liability for such future cases. ' 103
Such guidelines will give broadcasters known parameters within
which to work.
In the throwing star hypothetical, the broadcast of a unique act of
easily imitatable violence, during hours when it is known children
will be watching, suggests a possible breach of the broadcaster's duty
of reasonable care. Considering all the facts of the particular case, a
jury would be justified in concluding that there was such a breach.
Cause in Fact
Once it is determined that the broadcaster has breached a duty of
reasonable care to the plaintiff, it must be further demonstrated that
the defendant's breach of that duty was the actual cause of the in-
jury."" Again, this is a question for the jury's consideration.105
Because of the complexity of human behavior, when a child imi-
tates an act of violence, there may be many additional factors that
contribute to cause an injury.106 An examination of documented inci-
dents illustrates this problem. One example involved a child who put
ground glass into the family stew after observing such an act on tele-
vision. 0 7 If the child had not seen the act on television he almost
certainly would not have thought to do it. However, once exposed to
the idea, the televised suggestion combined with all his individual
behavioral tendencies to produce an injurious result.
Nevertheless, scientists have established a relationship between
television violence and imitative violent behavior. 08 This correlation
103. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79
(1968).
104. See generally W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 5, § 41.
105. The issue of causation in fact can be determined by applying a "but for" test
or a "substantial factor" test. The former entails determining whether the event would
not have happened "but for" the defendant's conduct. The latter asks whether the con-
duct was a substantial factor in causing the injury, recognizing that other causes may
also have contributed. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 5, 341.
106. See generally STEIN & FREDRICH, IMPACT OF TELEVISION ON CHILDREN AND
YOUTH (1975) (thorough discussion of factors that affect the relation of violence to
behavior).
107. Incident reported in R. LIEBERT, J. NEAL & E. DAVIDSON, supra note 74, at
3.
108. Many scientists have proven to their own satisfaction that children imitate
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is supported by laboratory and field studies as well as actual docu-
mented incidents.109 This evidence, taken as a whole, may reasonably
lead to a determination of cause in fact, dependent on the individual
facts of the case. Generally, the more unique an act of broadcast
violence is and the more closely an imitation resembles it, the easier
it should be to establish cause in fact.
In the hypothetical situation, a jury could determine that the
broadcast was the cause in fact of the injury. If the child did not
know how to construct or use a throwing star prior to the broadcast,
when she was exposed to the idea, she was given access to dangerous
information. This idea, combined with her behavioral tendencies, re-
sulted in an injury. The broadcast which gave the child the idea was
not the only cause, but a jury could determine that it satisfies either
the "substantial factor" or the "but for" test of causation.
The causal connection between a negligent broadcast and the re-
sulting injury is highly analogous to the causal relationships in all of
the introductory hypotheticals (1 through 5). A jury may find that a
neighbor who negligently abandons a dangerous article is the cause
of any resulting injuries if a trespassing child wrongfully obtains the
article and uses it to injure someone." 0 Likewise, a jury may find
that a broadcast is the cause of any resulting injuries when a child is
negligently exposed to an act of violence likely to be imitated.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT BAR LIABILITY
Once the basic elements of a cause of action for broadcaster liabil-
ity have been established, one must consider whether the first
amendment should protect the broadcaster from liability. The first
amendment was not intended to protect all speech."' There have al-
violence on television. See supra notes 76-82. The issue, however, should not be "proving
a case against TV violence . . . . The legal analogy [of causation] simply doesn't apply
to science where we come closer to an elusive truth by a constant reexamination of the
evidence." See STRICKLAND & CARTER, T.V. VIOLENCE AND THE CHILD I00 (1977).
Part of the problem for scientists in establishing a definite cause and effect relationship is
their inability to ethically experiment with young children in laboratory settings. Re-
searchers are not able to place children in situations where they could be observed di-
rectly imitating the violence that is seen daily on commercial television. Much of the
violence involves weapons and results in severe injury or death. What investigator would
place a child in a room with a real weapon to 'scientifically' observe what happens? R.
LIEBERT, J. NEAL & E. DAVIDSON, supra note 74, at 57. The documented cases of imita-
tion, however, provide ample support for the scientists' conclusions. See supra notes 82-
83 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 81-83, 86.
110. See supra note 7.
111. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
ways been certain classes of speech deemed unworthy of constitu-
tional protection." 2 The policies behind punishment for or preven-
tion of certain classes of speech apply to an even stronger degree in
the situation where a broadcaster may have proximately caused
death or severe injury to an innocent victim. An examination of un-
protected areas of speech will illustrate.
Unprotected Speech
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,"a the Supreme Court held that
certain words are of such slight social value that the interests of or-
der and morality clearly outweigh any benefit possibly derived from
them." 4 In Chaplinsky, the prohibited speech consisted of insulting
or "fighting words,""' 5 words that are likely to cause an average ad-
dressee to fight or to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 11 The
"average" addressee in the Chaplinsky case was the city marshal, a
law enforcement officer. It is clear from Chaplinsky that the first
amendment protects a law enforcement officer from being called a
name. It would be illogical if the first amendment, on the other
hand, denies a child who is emotionally and physically injured from
a bottle rape which the perpetrators allegedly imitated from a televi-
sion show, the right to take her case to a jury for determination." 7
An imitatable act of violence broadcast to young children has the
same "direct tendency to cause acts of violence," as the fighting
words discussed in Chaplinsky."18 If the judiciary seeks to protect
adults from words that may cause them to act violently, it likewise
should prevent young children, who have less experience, judgment,
and self-control, from exposure to a barrage of enticing and danger-
ous acts that they are likely to imitate. If the social interest in order
and morality overrides the usual right of free speech in the former
situation, it should impose liability in the latter." 9
112. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
The right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circum-
stances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous and the insulting or "fighting words."
Id. at 572-3.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 572.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. But see Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178
Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert. denied sub. nom. Neimi v. National Broadcasting Co., 458
U.S. 1108, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1132 (1982).
118. 315 U.S. at 573.
119. Chaplinsky was a case involving state regulation of individuals. It was not a
civil liability case. It is discussed for the purpose of establishing judicial standards for
treatment of speech which is considered harmful. The same social policies that permit
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Defamation is another form of speech for which social interests
outweigh first amendment protection.120 A broadcaster may be held
civilly liable for negligent infliction of injury to a private individ-
ual.1 21 Gertz v. Robert Welch, the leading case on this subject, rec-
ognizes that imposition of civil liability may result in self-censor-
ship. 22 The legitimate state interests in compensating individuals for
the harm inflicted on them, however, outweighs the interest in avoid-
ing self-censorship.' 23
If a private individual can establish a cause of action in negli-
gence, he can recover for injury to his reputation.12 4 It is illogical to
allow recovery for negligent harm to a person's reputation but not to
allow recovery if his or her injury is physical in nature. The policy
interest of compensating an individual for wrongful injury is present
in both situations.
In a defamation case, the broadcast would be the direct cause of
the injury to a person's reputation. By contrast, in the case of imi-
tated violence, the broadcast would be the indirect cause of the in-
jury. Nevertheless, if legal cause can be established in both situa-
tions, there is no reason to impose liability in one instance and allow
first amendment protection in the other. To allow first amendment
protection, without resolving the issue of duty and causation, allows
immunity from liability despite fault and ignores the policy of com-
pensating wrongfully injured plaintiffs. Such potential immunity is
especially troublesome when dealing with serious physical injuries.
The court in Gertz allowed defamation victims recovery for negli-
gence because many deserving plaintiffs would otherwise be unable
to receive compensation for wrongful injury to their reputations. 25
The court in Olivia N.,' 26 however, denied a nine-year-old rape vic-
state regulation of harmful speech should permit the self-regulation that may result from
civil liability.
120. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 322 (1974).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 342.
123. "The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is not the only societal
value at issue." Id. at 341. Absolute protection of the communications media would "re-
quire a total sacrifice of the competing values served by the law of defamation," one of
which is "the compensation of individuals for harm inflicted on them." Id. Likewise, the
absolute protection of broadcasters, in the case of imitative violence, is a "total sacrifice"
of the value of compensating individuals for harm inflicted on them.
124. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 322 (1974).
125. Id. at 342-43.
126. Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr.
888 (1981), cert. denied sub. nom. Neimi v. National Broadcasting Co., 458 U.S. 1108,
reh'g denied, 488 U.S. 1132 (1982).
tim the chance to receive compensation for a wrongful physical in-
jury. It is incongruous that broadcasters are liable for injuries to a
person's reputation that result from negligence, but immunized from
liability by the first amendment for physical injuries that also result
because of the broadcaster's negligence.
The Supreme Court has recognized a special interest in the pro-
tection of children when applying the first amendment. The Consti-
tution permits regulation of speech for the well being of children. In
Ginsberg v. New York, 127 material containing nudity, while constitu-
tionally protected for adults, was not protected for children. 128 The
Court reached this conclusion by adopting a definition of obscenity 129
which varies in accordance with the audience to whom the material
is directed. 130 The Court adopted this standard in recognition of the
need to protect the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the
community.
The Court in Ginsberg offered two reasons for applying a special
standard to children: (1) a parental right of supervision in the home,
and (2) society's legitimate interest in the well-being of children.
The courts in interpreting the first amendment have consistently rec-
ognized a parent's authority to supervise the upbringing of children
in his or her own household. 13 ' The Court held that a parent should
be supported by the laws in fulfilling his or her parental
responsibilities. 32
Responsible parents who wish to avoid exposing their children to
imitatable televised acts of violence may have a very difficult time. 33
As in Ginsberg, parents in this situation are entitled to the support of
the laws which should encourage responsible programming, by hold-
ing broadcasters responsible for failing to use reasonable care.
The Court in Ginsberg also recognized that the states are justified
in imposing reasonable regulations on the distribution of material to
children, based on society's interest in protecting their welfare.134 In
Ginsberg, the Court held that exposure to material containing nudity
127. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
128. Id. at 634-5.
129. Id. at 635.
130. Id. at 636.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Eighty percent of all television shows are violent; overt acts of violence occur
on children's shows on the average of one per minute. Devney & Bensel, Television and
Children: A Physician's Guide, 62 MINN. MED. 833 (1979). It is presently impossible for
a parent to predict when an act of imitative violence will be shown. Parents cannot be
expected to sit with censor buttons and prescreen every show. See generally supra note
93 and accompanying text. Short of not keeping a television set in the home, or severely
restricting its use, a parent has only limited control of the material to which a child will
be exposed. The broadcaster, on the other hand, is in a position not only to predict but
also to control programming content.
134. Id. at 640.
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impaired the morals and ethics of the young and was a clear and
present danger to the people of the state.135 If the sale of material
containing nudity to a sixteen-year-old constitutes a clear and pre-
sent danger to the public, then educating children in subjects such as
weaponry, rape, and arson 36 is equally such a danger.
In Ginsberg, the state only had to show that it was not irrational
to find material containing nudity harmful to justify its exclusion
from first amendment protection. 37 With thousands of studies warn-
ing of the dangerous effects of television violence on children,13 8 it
likewise is not irrational to find such violent material harmful.
Limited Protection of the Broadcast Media
Of all communication forms, broadcasting receives the least
amount of first amendment protection. 3 9 In F.C.C. v. Pacifica, the
Court prohibited the radio broadcast of allegedly obscene language
during the hours children were likely to be listening. The Court enu-
merated several reasons for this limitation of a broadcaster's protec-
tion.1 40 These reasons are the pervasive presence of the media and its
accessibility to children.
Television plays a very large role in the lives of most Americans.
In Pacifica, the pervasiveness of radio was a reason for limiting first
amendment protection. Television is even more pervasive than radio.
Children apparently spend considerably more time watching televi-
sion than they do listening to the radio. 4'
Pacifica also pointed out that because radio is broadcast into the
privacy of one's own home, the subject of its broadcast should be
afforded less protection than other forms of communication.142 Ac-
cording to the Court, the individual's right to be left alone in the
privacy of his or her home outweighs a broadcaster's first amend-
ment right. 43 The Pacifica rationale should apply with greater
weight to television broadcasts where the visual characteristics add
to the potential intrusiveness of the communication and the pervasive
135. Id. at 642.
136. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
137. Id. at 641.
138. See supra notes 81-85.
139. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 725, 748 (1978).
140. Id. at 748-50.
141. Children watch an average of 56 hours of television a week. Deveney & Ben-
sel, Television and Children, MINN. MED. 833 (1979).
142. F.C.C. v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
143. Id.
presence is much greater.
The second factor in Pacifica which justified limiting first amend-
ment protection to broadcasters was radio's easy accessibility to chil-
dren.' Television is not only easily accessible but also highly attrac-
tive to children who spend a great deal of their time watching. The
court in Pacifica found that the easy access to and pervasiveness of
the medium, combined with those special considerations applied to
children in the Ginsberg case, justified limiting first amendment pro-
tection for broadcasters. If these considerations permit a total prohi-
bition of offensive language during hours when children may be
watching, they could also serve to justify the minimal amount of
self-regulation regarding violence that would result if liability were
imposed.
Pacifica prohibited the broadcasting of "filthy language" during
hours when children were likely to be listening. 45 It would be incon-
sistent of courts to be more concerned about a child's exposure to
"naughty words" than they are about a child's assimilation of ag-
gressive behavior. The latter has a much greater potential for dam-
age, both to the child and to society.
The Brandenberg Standard of Incitement
As noted previously, the incitement standard of Brandenberg v.
Ohio 4' is not applicable to a civil suit alleging an injury resulting
from a child's imitation of television violence. It is, nevertheless, the
standard which courts have applied. 4 7 The courts have ignored thejudicial recognition of different standards for children in all areas of
law.
The law of torts recognizes special duties owed to children because
of certain characteristics which make them more vulnerable than
adults. 48 Likewise, in construing the first amendment the courts
have applied different standards to children than those applied to
adults. 4 9 This reflects society's interests in the moral upbringing of
children.150 By analogy to these special standards, courts should not
apply the same adult standard of incitement to cases involving
children.
144. Id. at 749.
145. Id. at 750.
146. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). For a discussion of the facts of this case and their
inapplicability to children's imitative acts of violence see supra note 14.
147. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
148. These characteristics include lack of experience, lack of judgment, inability to
assess risk, immaturity, mischievousness, exuberance of spirit, and bravado. See supra
notes 43-68 and accompanying text.
149. For a discussion of Ginsberg and Pacifica, see supra notes 127-45 and accom-
panying text.
150. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37 (1968).
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Furthermore, Brandenberg also requires a finding of imminence of
harm.15' A child with a dangerous idea may think about it for sev-
eral weeks before he acts on it; likewise, he might hide a dangerous
weapon under his bed for an indefinite period of time. The potential
lack of imminence in both cases does not decrease the potential for
danger. In fact, in broadcaster liability cases the potential danger
has already resulted in an actual injury for which the plaintiff seeks
compensation.
The Brandenberg incitement standard appears badly misapplied in
these cases. The definition of incitement should be modified if courts
are going to apply it to television broadcasts aimed at young chil-
dren. Or preferably, it should not be applied at all because it blindly
protects the broadcaster from liability while ignoring the real issues
of duty and causation that should be addressed.
PREVENTING A CHILLING EFFECT ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Courts in media cases are understandably very concerned about
causing a "chilling effect" on free speech.'52 Because of the difficulty
of proving the elements of a negligence cause of action, however,
only those televised acts of violence which truly pose a foreseeable
risk of injury would subject a broadcaster to liability. A broadcaster
who exercises reasonable care in programming decisions would not
be found liable even if an injury were to result. The chilling effect in
this situation would be very slight.
First, the proposed liability would not result in a noticeable dimi-
nution of televised violence. Most violence would probably remain.
The only chilling effect would be on the broadcasts that contain vio-
lence that pose a foreseeable risk of imitation. Broadcasters could
conceivably portray violent conduct using army tanks, machine guns,
airplanes, laser weaponry and sophisticated explosives (provided they
did not reveal how to construct them) because such acts could not
foreseeably be imitated by children. Imposition of liability would
merely cause broadcasters to substitute non-imitatable acts of vio-
lence for imitatable acts of violence. This would be its only effect on
free speech.
In addition, broadcasters would not be held to a standard of strict
liability. As in Gertz,153 they need only exercise reasonable care in
determining the likelihood of imitation. If broadcasters do not
151. 395 U.S. at 447.
152. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-79 (1964).
153. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
breach the duty of reasonable care, they will not be held liable, even
if an act of imitation results in injury to someone. In this way the
broadcaster is protected from undefined standards that might chill
free speech.154
Furthermore, the government would not be censoring ideas based
on their political, philosophical or religious value but on their poten-
tial for causing a physical injury. The determination of the likelihood
of imitation should be based on the research of politically neutral
sociologists, psychologists, scientists, and the reasonable judgment of
the broadcasters themselves, not on some politically charged body of
censors.
155
Finally, imposition of liability would not limit adult viewers only
to programs suitable for children.156 Alternatives to commercial tele-
vision, such as movies on home video recorders, and pay TV chan-
nels, are available to mature adults who wish to view acts of violence
that children might imitate if viewed.
Concededly, imposing liability on broadcasters may have a slight
chilling effect on television broadcasters. But that has always been
the ultimate purpose of the law of torts, to chill and thereby discour-
age tortfeasors.157
CONCLUSION
The law has long recognized that cases involving children require
special standards. This is true in both the law of torts and in the
application of the first amendment. In light of the extremely perva-
sive presence of television in the lives of most children and the grave
risk involved in subjecting them to countless acts of imitatable vio-
lence, courts should no longer allow broadcasters to hide behind the
first amendment. Broadcasters should not be treated any differently
than parents, teachers, or neighbors. If they create an unreasonable
risk of harm which results in an injury, they should be subjected to
liability.
NANCY L. MILLER
154. With the imposition of a defined standard of care, the broadcaster would have
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